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Abstract
This paper develops a model of cross-border M&A activity that features firm-level productivity
shocks and endogenous export activity. We show that foreign firms will be relatively more attracted
to targets in the domestic country that had high productivity levels that induced them to invest in
large export networks several years prior to acquisition, but subsequently experienced a negative
productivity shock (i.e., cherries for sale). From the theory we derive a dynamic panel binary
choice empirical model to predict cross-border M&A activity, and find strong evidence for our
hypotheses connecting the evolution of firm-level productivity to the ultimate targets of cross-
border acquisitions using French firm-level data.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Productivity, Export Networks
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1. Introduction
A significant majority of foreign direct investment (FDI), especially between developed coun-
tries, is in the form of cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity.1 This fact suggests that
FDI flows across countries, and their subsequent economic effects, are significantly related to the
choice of multinational enterprises to acquire target firms with specific characteristics. Once target
IThe authors owe many thanks to seminar participants at the NBER ITI Spring Meeting 2012, Gep-ifo confer-
ence on International Trade, Productivity and Factor Movements at CESifo, University of British Columbia, Brown
University and the Banque de France, UC-Irvine, Indiana University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,
Tsinghua University. Farid Toubal would like to thank the CEPR project “Globalization Investment and Services
Trade” funded by the European Commission under FP7-PEOPLE-ITN-2008-21. The authors are responsible for re-
maining errors.
Email addresses: bruceb@uoregon.edu (Bruce A. Blonigen), Lionel.Fontagne@univ-paris1.fr (Lionel
Fontagne´), sly@uoregon.edu (Nicholas Sly), ftoubal@ens-cachan.fr (Farid Toubal)
1For example, UNCTAD (2000) reports that the total value of cross-border M&A constitutes more that 80% of
total global FDI flows.
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firms have been acquired by multinationals, a significant majority of affiliate production is exported
to nearby countries, which suggests that export networks are among the key features of target firms
sought by multinational enterprises. In this paper we develop a model of cross-border M&A that
features firm-level productivity shocks and endogenous export behavior among target firms. From
the model we derive a dynamic binary choice model, which exploits the autoregressive nature of
firm productivity levels and sunk investments in their export activity, to predict cross-border M&A
flows. Using administrative data from a panel of French firms we find strong evidence that export
activities promote takeover by foreign multinational firms, and that productivity shocks within
target firms are linked to the timing at which these cross-border acquisitions take place.
There is nascent international trade literature that, like this study, views the cross-border acqui-
sition decision as being motivated by the matching of complementary assets between multinational
and domestic firms (e.g., Nocke and Yeaple (2007;2008), Head & Ries (2008), and Guadalupe et al.
(2012)); although Neary (2007) alternatively views cross-border M&A activity as being motivated
by market power considerations.2 While this literature has provided important contributions to our
growing knowledge about cross-border M&A activity, a common feature of these prior studies is
that they are static, with firm characteristics being fixed over time. Failing to recognize that the
assets firms possess evolve over time omits important information about the incentives of target
firms to accept current takeover bids. Moreover, because changes in target firm productivity are
likely to be correlated with the state of the targets’ other assets (e.g., the skills of workers/managers
2Nocke and Yeaple (2007;2008) provide a general equilibrium framework characterizing the matching of mobile
and non-mobile assets that occurs in a world of cross-border M&A. Nocke & Yeaple (2007) shows that whether
cross-border M&A activity involves the least or most efficient firms in the economy depends on whether there is
heterogeneity across firms in their mobile assets (such as productivity) or immobile, location-specific assets (such
as local distribution capabilities). The analysis in Nocke & Yeaple (2008) focuses on the choice between greenfield
and cross-border M&A as the mode of FDI, with theory and evidence from U.S. data that the most productive firms
choose greenfield over cross-border M&A. Head & Ries (2008) develop a model matching between managers and
productive assets in a multi-country world. Their framework explains well the strong gravity relationships in cross-
border and FDI data, as large countries have more managers and firm assets to match, while greater distances make it
more difficult for managers to monitor operations of those assets. In Guadalupe et al. (2012), target firms’ productive
capabilities complement new investments by multinationals and these assets are match via acquisition, as is evidenced
in Spanish data. As an alternative to asset-matching models, Neary (2007) provides a general equilibrium model where
oligopolistic firms pursue cross-border M&A activity in the pursuit of increased market power. The paper shows that
cross-border M&A activity can be spurred from trade liberalization as firms in countries where their sector has a
comparative advantage acquire firms in countries where their sector has a comparative disadvantage.
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employed or their ability to integrate the acquiring firm’s technological investments), the omission
of firm-level productivity shocks can generate substantial bias when estimating cross-border M&A
activity. Another common view held in asset matching models of cross-border M&A is that the
relevant target firm characteristics are specific to either the target or acquiring firm’s home market.
However, Hanson et al. (2001) provide broad evidence that affiliates export a significant portion
of total sales to nearby countries, so that the ability of targets to enter proximate markets can also
have a substantial impact on acquisition activity.3 Again, the propensity of firms to export is tightly
linked to other assets, such as their productivity level, revenue, or skill intensity (Bernard & Jensen
(1999)). Thus ignoring the endogenous decision of target firms to export may introduce substantial
bias when estimating cross-border M&A activity.
In this paper we develop a three-stage model where firms have varying capabilities to make
(sunk) investments in export networks and face possible future shocks to their physical productiv-
ity. In the first stage, each firm receives a random draw of its productivity, as well as its capability
to set up export networks. Based on these draws, firms then select the foreign markets, if any, to
which they will export, and incur substantial sunk (or beachhead) costs to establish their export
network. In stage 2, firms realize persistent productivity shocks, which can then alter how much
the firm values the option of continuing to sell goods on its established export network indepen-
dently. In the final stage, firms participate in an M&A market, where domestic targets are acquired
based on both their current capabilities, changes in productivity, and the previously established
export network.
Modeling a multi-period environment with firm-specific shocks to their capabilities allows us
to predict not only which firms are acquired, but also the timing of the acquisition. Furthermore,
export networks established by domestic targets are likely to differ from those established by for-
eign acquirers due to locational differences, and are, therefore, of relatively high value to a foreign
firm.4 Other domestic firms are less likely to value targets with large export networks, because
3We note that the acquisition of export-networks via cross-border M&A is consistent with prior evidence that a
significant share of worldwide FDI activity is by export-platform motives (Blonigen et al. (2007) and Ekholm et al.
(2007)).
4An equivalent interpretation is that established export networks are endogenously determined sources of (trade)
cost synergies between firms in different locations.
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they will independently establish similar export networks due to their identical location; redun-
dancy makes the target firm’s export networks relatively less valuable to domestic acquirers as
it is to foreign firms. Thus, we are able to predict which targets are more likely candidates for
cross-border M&A, as opposed to domestic acquisition.
To empirically assess the role of changes in firm characteristics and export activity in promot-
ing cross-border acquisitions, we examine our model’s hypotheses using detailed administrative
data on French manufacturing firms from 1999-2006. We use the theoretical model of endogenous
export behavior and cross-border M&A to derive a dynamic panel binary choice model that pre-
dicts which targets are acquired by multinationals as their characteristics change over time. An
important feature of the empirical model is that it circumvents the initial conditions problem asso-
ciated with estimating the likelihood of acquisition when firm-specific sunk costs to enter foreign
markets are unobserved, and the target firm’s initial level of productivity corresponds to a time pe-
riod that may predate the sample period. Each target firm chooses where to export conditional on
its own costs to enter foreign markets and productivity, in anticipation of productivity shocks and
the likelihood of being acquired by a foreign firm. Thus, we incorporate a measure of previously
observed investments in developing export networks, which is conditional on the unobserved firm-
specific sunk costs to access foreign markets and previous levels of firm productivity. We then
exploit the autoregressive nature of firm-level productivities to derive an empirical strategy that
avoids the biases associated with estimating the likelihood of acquisition where previous levels of
firm productivity are observed, but perhaps not the initial level of firm productivity, and there are
correlated unobserved effects.5 Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, we find
robust evidence that the decision to export to multiple countries, and recent negative productivity
shocks, both significantly increase the likelihood that a domestic target firm is acquired by a for-
eign multinational. We also show that the export network effect is larger when foreign firms differ
more in their locational costs from the target, as there will then be less overlap in the networks
independently established by the acquirer and target, making the export network of the target more
5See Arellano & Carrasco (2003), Wooldridge (2005), and Honore & Tamer (2006) for detailed discussions about
the initial conditions problem associated with estimating non-linear dynamic panel data models with unobserved ef-
fects. Our derived estimation strategy is closely related to those studied in Honore & Lewbel (2002).
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valuable to the acquirer.
Concerning the specific assets that acquirers seek, the classic notion in the finance literature
is that M&A activity is one of natural selection, as well-performing firms take over the assets of
poorly-performing firms (e.g., Manne (1965)). Consistent with this view, Lichtenberg & Siegel
(1987) find evidence that “lemons” (i.e., poorly performing firms) are the primary targets in U.S.
acquisitions in manufacturing. Several existing models of cross-border M&A also often predict
that “lemons” will be targets, including the M-industry model in Nocke & Yeaple (2007) and
in Neary (2007). However, recent empirical evidence suggests that acquiring firms, especially
foreign firms, are acquiring highly productive “cherries.” This has been found using data from
Chile (Ramondo (2009)), Indonesia (Arnold & Javorcik (2009)), the U.S. (Criscuolo & Martin
(2009)), and Spain (Guadalupe et al. (2012)). The multi-period aspect of our model allows us to
reconcile this seemingly opposing evidence by showing that “cherry” or “lemon” effects actually
refer to the value of target firm assets at different states over time. We show that multinationals seek
valuable assets among targets (export networks) that can be acquired when the price is relatively
low (after a negative productivity shock). That is, they seek ”cherries for sale.”
There is also a small recent finance literature modeling a variety of motivations for general
M&A activity (domestic or cross-border). Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) is a classic model
of positive assortative matching of assets and Maksimovic & Phillips (2009) shows how differen-
tial demand shocks across sectors alters firms decisions to acquire/own assets across these sectors.
Gorton et al. (2009) illustrates why firms may strategically grow through acquisitions of smaller
firms to avoid being acquired, and develops a model where firms adjust their optimal assets (pre-
sumably through M&A activity) in response to industry-level productivity shocks. As we do here,
Yang (2008) highlights the importance of firm-level versus aggregate shocks in promoting acqui-
sition activity; she calibrates the model to correspond to moments in US acquisitions data, and
examines how firms can grow or downsize through acquisition activity. Our analysis is distinct in
that we are able to solve explicitly for equilibrium M&A activity, and derive an empirical specifi-
cation that predicts M&A activity from firm and industry characteristics, particularly when there
may be important unobserved firm-level characteristics. Furthermore, our multi-country frame-
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work with endogenous investments in export networks allows us to separately predict cross-border
versus domestic M&A.
In summary, our paper provides three main contributions to the literature. First, we build a
simple multi-period model of M&A that shows how firm-level shocks promote acquisition activity,
and how accounting for these shocks provides a potential resolution to the inconsistent cherries and
lemons distinction found in the prior literature. Second, we incorporate endogenous export activity
among target firms to show, both theoretically and empirically, the large and crucial role played by
export networks in promoting cross-border M&A activity. Finally, we show how one can condition
on realizations of past export behavior and productivity shocks to overcome the initial conditions
problem associated with estimating non-linear dynamic panel data models of M&A activity with
correlated unobserved effects.
In the next section, we provide some basic descriptive statistics and figures of cross-border
M&A activity using detailed firm-level data from France. Even these simple graphs demonstrate
strong evidence that multinationals seek targets that are “cherries for sale.” In Sections 3, 4, and 5,
we provide theory to explain these patterns more formally. In Section 6 we derive our empirical
framework from the theory to predict the likelihood of foreign acquisition. Section 7 describes our
sample compiled from several sources of administrative data on French firms. The results of our
empirical analysis are in Section 8, followed by concluding remarks.
2. A First Look at the Patterns in the Data
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics on the level, and evolution, of productivity and
export networks of French firms that are acquired by foreign multinationals. The sample for our
analysis is built from several micro-datasets that are provided by different French administrations
and covers the period from 1999-2006. These data are matched using the firm tax-register number
which identifies each unique firm located in France.
We identify firms involved in a merger or acquisition using the ‘extended’ LIFI (LIaison FI-
nancie`re) data, a dataset that has information on the ownership and nationality of the parent com-
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Figure 1: Target Productivity and Export Networks Margins Across Time
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Source: Authors calculations based on “LIFI” and “EAE” data.
pany of firms located in France.6 We use LIFI to identify the year of a takeover and the foreign
status of the acquiring firm. We define a firm as having undergone a foreign M&A if the owner in
time t is foreign, while the owner in t − 1 is French. Similarly, a firm undergoes a domestic M&A
if it changes ownership but the owner remains French.
To calculate firm-level TFP, we first merge the LIFI data to the EAE (Enquete Annuelle d’Entreprise)
annual business survey dataset, which contains information from firms’ income statements and
balance sheets. It also reports the location of firms in France and their 4-digit sector of principal
activity. The survey has information on firms with more than 25 employees. Importantly, the EAE
dataset is exhaustive above this reporting threshold. In order to compute total factor productivity
(TFP), we restrict the data to the manufacturing sectors. We compute firm-level TFP using the pro-
6A firm classified as French independent is a resident in France and is not owned by a group. A French affiliate is
resident in France and owned by a French parent. A foreign affiliate is a firm that is located in France but owned by a
foreign group. An affiliate is foreign owned if the foreign firm controls more than 50% of its shares or voting rights.
The results are insensitive to the specified cutoff for an acquisition to take place, as the median share of voting shares
owned by a group is 99%.
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cedure described by Olley & Pakes (1996), controlling for the simultaneity bias that arises from
the endogeneity of a firm’s input selection. We then calculate a firm’s detrended TFP relative to
its sectoral average. Note that we find similar patterns among target firms when considering other
measure of firms’ technical capabilities such as market share.7
The left panel of Figure 1 plots normalized detrended TFP for the French firms acquired by
foreign owners from three years prior to the acquisition through four years after the acquisition.
The middle line shows the relative detrended TFP for the average French firm acquired by a for-
eign owner, whereas the lines above and below show the relative detrended TFP for the 95th and
5th percentile, respectively. The pattern is striking and consistent with a “for sale” effect. Relative
detrended TFP is falling significantly in the three years prior to acquisition for French firms who
are acquired by foreign firms. The average acquired firm falls from being 1.5% above the mean of
all firms in its sector to being just an average firm in its sector at the time of acquisition. By way of
comparison, the 1.5% reduction in productivity for the typical acquisition target corresponds to ap-
proximately 1/16 of a standard deviation of the observed year-to-year changes in firm-level TFP. In
other words, the decline in productivity among acquisition targets are significant and widespread,
but not driven by outliers in terms of the magnitude of firm-level shocks.
The other important feature of the data is that the acquired French firms (from as low as the
5th percentile) all have an above-average relative detrended TFP in the third year before the ac-
quisition; i.e., these acquired firms are “cherries,” in the initial TFP dimension. In years prior to
acquisition, targets of multinational takeovers had high productivities that endow them with rela-
tively strong incentives to invest in valuable assets, such as export capacity. In our model below,
and consistent with well-known stylized facts, high TFP levels allow a firm to profitably export to
many destinations. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the corresponding export networks estab-
lished by firms acquired during the sample period. Information about firm-level trading behavior,
which we use to construct our variable related to export networks, is taken from the French cus-
toms (Douanes). We observe the yearly value of exports of each firm at the product-level, in each
7In Section 8.3 we replicate our main results using observed firm-level market share in place of estimated firm-level
TFP.
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destination market.8 A target firm’s export network is defined as the number of unique countries
served.
The pattern of the export networks established by French firms who are acquired by foreign
firms further reinforces the evidence that acquired targets are cherries in the dimension of export
networks, as the average firm has an export network that is 40-50% larger than its sector’s average
in the years leading up to the foreign acquisition. Again, the lines above and below report the
statistic for the 95th and 5th percentile of the sample, respectively. Even the 5th percentile target in
the sample has an export network that is well above its own sector’s average. Note that even as the
productivity of target firms falls, as seen in left panel of Figure 1, we see in the right panel that the
export networks of target firms remain stable prior to acquisition. This fact suggest that the costs
to begin exporting to a new market are in part sunk, and that an export network is maintained even
as firm productivity falls. While we have only used the number of country links as our measure
of export networks, qualitatively identical patterns are in the data when we measure exports by
number of exported products or exported country-product combinations. However, in the statistical
analysis below, we will show that country links are the main driver in our export network effects.
While this paper’s focus is on who gets acquired and when, there are interesting patterns of
TFP and export networks after foreign acquisition in our sample. Firm-level TFP continues to fall
in the first years after the acquisition and then rebounds, and for the majority of firms, improves
significantly three and four years later. Export networks begin to increase for the target firm im-
mediately after the acquisition. The fall in firm TFP in the first years after acquisition, with growth
in the number of export destinations, and increase in productivity after acquisition, are each con-
sistent with the evidence in Guadalupe et al. (2012), where acquiring firms make costly ex post
investments in the target’s production technology and export capacity.
Our goal in the remainder of the paper is to develop a model of exporting and M&A behavior
that is consistent with the patterns in Figure 1, and to derive an empirical strategy that demonstrates
how acquisition activity is motivated by export networks and productivity changes.
8We use the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature, a European extension of the 6-digit Harmonized System. We have
approximately 200 possible destinations and 8,000 different product categories.
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3. Model
We build a model of a multi-country world with differentiated producers from each country
operating in a single sector. The timing of the model occurs in three stages. In stage one, firms are
born with a specific productivity, and then choose whether or not to make investments that allow
them to export to foreign markets. The multi-country trading environment builds from Helpman
et al. (2008), with firm-specific sunk costs to enter foreign markets as in Impullitti et al. (2013).
In stage 2, domestic firms realize a permanent shock to their productivity. We then focus on a
single country, and examine M&A activity. In stage 3, target firms are bought and sold in the do-
mestic M&A market, including the possibility that foreign multinationals acquire domestic firms.
Our goal is to demonstrate how the export networks established in stage 1, and the realization of
productivity shocks among firms in stage 2, influence cross-border M&A activity in stage 3.
Basics: Consumption & Production
The world is comprised of a mass of countries indexed by j ∈ [1, J]. There is a continuum
of products in each country, and the representative consumer in each country j has the following
utility function:
U = ln

∫
l∈B j
x j(l)(−1)/dl


−1
,  > 1, (1)
where x j(l) is the consumption of product l, B j is the set of products available for consumption in
country j, and  is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, which is common across countries.
Letting E j denote the expenditure (or income) level of country j, its demand for product l is derived
as
x j(l) =
p j(l)−E j
P1−j
, (2)
where p j(l) is the price of product l in country j, and P j is the country’s ideal price index, defined
as
10
P j =

∫
l∈B j
p j(l)1−dl

1/(1−)
. (3)
Each country has a mass M j of risk-neutral firms, each producing a unique variety in a monopolistically-
competitive sector. The cost of producing a unit of output for a firm in country j is c ja, where a is
a firm-specific measure of the number of bundles of the country’s inputs required during produc-
tion, and c j is a country-specific measure of the cost of this bundle. The inverse of a represents
the firm’s productivity level. Each country has an identical cumulative distribution function Ga(a),
with support [aL, aH], that describes the distribution of productivity across firms.
3.1. Stage 1: Export networks
In order for a firm in country j to sell its product in country i , j, it must incur both a one-time
sunk cost, fi j, and a trade cost, τi j, that are specific to the i j country pair. For convenience, we
normalize f j j = 0 for each country j. The sunk nature of investments to enter foreign markets
is consistent with Impullitti et al. (2013), as well as the broad evidence of persistence in export
behavior among firms; see Bernard & Jensen (2004) for evidence from the US, Campa (2004) for
evidence from Spain, Bernard & Wagner (2001) for evidence from Germany.9
Within each country, firms differ in their ability to establish export networks. The sunk costs
are given in terms of the amount of domestic factors that must be hired at costs c j, where b fi j
is the total number of domestic factors that must be hired by a firm with parameter b in country
j in order to serve country i. Let Gb(b), be the distribution of the firm-specific parameter that
determines the cost to set up export networks, having support [bL, bH]. This additional source of
firm-level heterogeneity is motivated by several empirical facts. Roberts & Tybout (1997) provide
evidence that plant-level export behavior over time is consistent with the presence of sunk costs
to enter foreign markets, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in these sunk costs across
establishments. Foster et al. (2008) have shown that there is an important distinction between firms’
9We abstract from fixed costs of exporting that may need to be incurred after export networks have been established.
We note that, conditional on the at least some of the setup costs for exporting being sunk, none of our results are
affected by the possibility of additional recurring fixed costs of exporting in each period. We assume per period fixed
costs are zero solely to ease the exposition of the model.
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technical productivity and their ability to profitably serve a market when considering firm exit and
entry across time. And finally, Bernard et al. (2003) provide broad evidence that there is significant
overlap in the distribution of productivities across exporting and non-exporting plants, suggesting
additional fixed characteristics of firms influence their decision to sell to foreign markets.10
Generally we are agnostic about whether firm productivity parameters, a, and the firm-specific
parameter affecting the costs to export, b, are drawn independently. We are interested in the con-
ditional likelihood of acquisition given target firm characteristics, and so all our theoretical results
are maintained regardless of the joint distribution of firm productivity and export costs parameters.
Yet, a key focus of our analysis will be to use the model to derive an empirical strategy that gen-
erates consistent estimates of how target firm characteristics impact M&A activity, even if there is
correlation between the initial draws of productivity and market access costs among firms.
We assume that transport costs are of the iceberg variety, where τi j units of a product must be
shipped from country j in order for one unit of the product to arrive in country i, and τi j > 1 for
i , j and τ j j = 1 for each country j. For each country j, we order the set of potential export
destinations in terms of their relative trade costs, cj fi jτ
−1
i j , and denote this set as D j ⊂ [1, J]. We
note for the reader that we are departing from Helpman et al. (2008) in specifying the costs to gain
access to market i as a one-time sunk cost, rather than a recurring per-period fixed cost. Define
N j(a, b) ⊂ D j as the endogenously determined set of destinations that a firm with characteristics
(a, b) in country j chooses to serve, which we call its export network.
Given a continuum of monopolistically-competitive firms, each producing a distinct variety, we
derive the standard price mark-up for a firm producing in country j with productivity parameter a
and selling in country i so that the price of variety l is given by p j(l) = τi j
c ja
−1 . From this, we can
write the operating profit a firm in country j receives from its sales of variety l to consumers in
country i, that have total expenditures Ei, conditional on its productivity parameter a, as
10Note that with CES preferences in all markets, lower firm-specific costs to enter each market is equivalent to firms
being able to sell proportionately more output in each market. In this sense, the second source of firm heterogeneity
represents variations target firms’ abilities to profitably operate in foreign markets. Syverson (2004) argues that their
is an important distinction between physical productivity and the ability to sell in a particular market, which further
motivates our inclusion of two distinct sources of firm-level heterogeneity.
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pili j(a) =
Ei

(
τi jc ja
Pi
)1−
. (4)
3.2. Stage 2: Shocks in firm productivity
After firms have incurred the sunk costs to establish their trade networks they are all subject
to persistent productivity shocks, 1/ψ, which are infinitesimal and independent of their initial pro-
ductivity level. Equivalently, a firm with initial productivity parameter a continues to operate with
productivity parameter aψ, once its shock is realized. We assume that (log) firm productivities
evolve according to a random walk such that the productivity shocks ln(1/ψ) are distributed log-
normal, with drift ω and variance σ. Upon realizing a productivity shock, firms maintain their
export network established in stage 1, N j(a, b). The profit a firm earns by operating independently
across its entire export network once its productivity shock is realized is
V j(aψ) =
∫
i∈N j(a,b)
pili j(aψ)d(i). (5)
Put another way, equation (5) represents the outside option of a target firm on the M&A market.
For any acquisition price offered, a target maintains the option of serving markets i ∈ N j(a, b) with
its realized productivity parameter aψ.
3.3. Stage 3: Merger & Acquisition
Domestic firms can sell their assets, including access to foreign consumers via their established
trade networks, to both foreign and domestic acquirers. Upon acquisition of a firm, the acquirer
can substitute its own productivity, a′, for the realized productivity of the target firm, aψ.11 In
addition to integrating technologies, once a merger is completed the acquiring firm can select the
location of production. In particular, the acquiring firm chooses the source country for exports
11For notational convenience we have let the acquiring firm substitute its own productivity for that of the target firm
such that a′ > aψ, consistent with the evidence in Nocke & Yeaple (2008) that it is relatively high productivity and high
revenue firms that select into cross-border acquisition activity. We note however that we impose no such restriction
and impose no assumption generally about the relative productivity of targets and acquirers; for any meeting between
firms the highest level of productivity is substituted for the lower. Writing instead that firms substitute max{a′, aψ}
would be overly cumbersome.
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that minimizes variable trade costs. Denote s jhi as the source of production that minimizes the
transportation cost of serving market i ∈ N j(a, b) ∩ Nh(a′, b′). The integration of the acquiring
firm’s technology, and the relocation of production within the merged firm, require fixed costs
given by I.12 The probability of meeting a potential acquirer during any particular time period is
given by the parameter µ.13
Upon acquisition, the merged firm produces two unique varieties that can be sold on the export
networks established by the acquirer and target. For any potential target with initial productivity
a, and trade network N j(a, b), an acquisition by a firm having productivity a′ from county h with
export network Nh(a′, b′) will create a conglomerate earning total operating profits
Z jh(a′, b′, a, b) =
∫
N j(a,b)∪Nh(a′,b′)
[pil
is jhi
(a′) + pim
is jhi
(a′)]d(i) (6)
There are two potential sources of surplus generated by a merger present in Z jh(a′, b′, a, b). The first
is the profit earned by continuing to sell the acquiring and target firms’ varieties on their existing
networks, but from the least costly source of production, s jhi . If either variety can be relocated
to a less costly production origin, then a merger generates a surplus through variable trade cost
savings. The second potential source of surplus is the additional profits that can be earned by
selling the target (acquiring) firm’s product on the export network of the acquiring (target) firm
that was otherwise not profitable to serve from their respective locations because of differences in
fixed exporting costs. The gains from accessing new markets via cross-border M&A are present
for any pair of firms such that N j(a, b) . Nh(a′, b′).14
12For now we specify the integration cost I as being independent of target firm characteristics. Guadalupe et al.
(2012) show that the investments acquirers make to update the target firm’s production technology and export capacity
following acquisition are complementary to its current productivity level. Also, Heyman et al. (2007) argue that
integration of the acquiring firm technology is a skill-bias activity. We will account for these facts in the empirical
analysis below.
13For simplicity we model the arrival rate of potential acquirers to be constant over time. Harford (2005) provides
evidence that the timing of M&A activity occurs in waves. We will account for the potential for the arrival rate of
acquirers to be non-homogeneous in the empirical analysis below.
14Our primary goal is to highlight how export networks established by firms, and changes in their productivity,
influence the likelihood of them being acquired by foreign firms. In doing so we have abstracted from strategic
incentives to acquire competitors within imperfectly competitive markets. The combined profits earned by a merged
firm over its different products may not be simply the sum of operating profits as in equation (6). An analysis of
14
4. Equilibrium
In this section we derive conditions that characterize a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, such that
firms in each country establish export networks in stage one, facing uncertainty about productivity
shocks in stage two, and the potential for cross-border M&A activity in stage three. We proceed
using backwards induction.
4.1. Equilibrium Acquisition Activity
In stage three, firms engage in M&A activity with the possibility that domestic targets are ac-
quired by foreign multinationals. Let Q jh(a′, b′, a, b, ψ) be the strike price a firm with productivity
given by a′ in country h pays to acquire a target firm with initial parameter a and realized shock
ψ in country j, given their specific costs to establish export networks b′ and b. The price of an
acquisition is determined non-cooperatively and divides the surplus created by a merger, with a
fraction β retained by the acquirer and a fraction 1 − β gained by the target firm. The probability
that any acquisition takes place is then given by the likelihood that the value of the merged firm in
(6), net the acquisition price, Q jh(a′, b′, a, b, ψ), is greater than the outside option of the target firm
in (5). As our interest is in cross-border M&A, we define the probability that a domestic firm with
initial productivity a, and network cost parameter b, in country j is acquired by a foreign firm from
country h at time t as Y jht(a, b), such that
Y jht(a, b) = Pr
[
Z jh(a′, b′, a, b) − Q jh(a′, b′, a, b, ψ) − I − Vh(a′) >
Q jh(a′, b′, a, b, ψ) − V j(aψ) | Mh, µ
]
, (7)
where Mh is the mass of firms in country h, and µ is the probability that the target encounters a
potential acquirer during time t.
Note that the surplus generated by a merger is strictly increasing in the productivity of the
acquiring firm and strictly decreasing in the ability of the acquirer to establish its own export net-
strategic motivations for cross-border M&A is provided by Neary (2007). While strategic incentives for mergers in an
oligopolistic sector are outside the scope of this paper, we note that a merger is likely to consolidate market power, in
addition to creating (trade) costs synergies. Thus we are likely to underestimate the probability of acquisition, rather
than overstate the motives.
15
works. Define A jh(b′, a, b) as the productivity parameter of a firm in country h that it is indifferent
between acquiring and not acquiring a target with any realized productivity parameter a, specific
export network costs b, in country j, given its own network costs b′. That is, suppressing its
arguments for simplicity, A jh satisfies
∫
N j(a,b)∪Nh(A jh,b′)
[pil
is jhi
(A jh) + pimis jhi
(A jh)]d(i)
≡
∫
i∈N j(a,b)
pili j(a)d(i) +
∫
i∈Nh(A jh,b′)
pimi j(A jh)d(i) + I (8)
We can now derive the likelihood of acquisition for any target firm. Let MW be the mass
of firms worldwide, so that the probability that the acquirer that meets a domestic target is from
country h is given by MhMW . The proportion of firms in country h with productivity such that there is a
non-negative surplus is generated by acquisition of firm (a, b) in country j, given their own network
costs, b′ is given by Ga
(
A jh(b′, a, b)
)
. Finally, aggregating across the distribution of export network
parameters of acquiring firms, the probability a target firm with realized productivity a is acquired
by a firm from country h is
Y jht(a, b) = µ
Mh
MW
bH∫
bL
Ga
(
A jh(b′, a, b)
)
dGb(b′). (9)
Our analysis of cross-border M&A activity will focus on the properties of equation (9), but we
will first complete the characterization of equilibrium.15
4.2. Equilibrium Target Firm Valuation with Productivity Shocks
In the second stage, target firms face productivity shocks that affect the value of operating
independently, and thereby the likelihood of accepting an offer to be acquired by another firm. Let
S jh(a′, b′, a, b, ψ) be the surplus retained by a target (a, b), which receives a shock ψ, in country j,
15From this point forward we suppress the arguments of A jh(b′, a, b) for notational convenience.
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upon acquisition by a firm (a′, b′) from country h;
S jh(a′, b′, a, bψ) =
[
Z jh(a′, b′, a, b) − I − V j(aψ) − Vh(a′)
]
(1 − β) .
The value of a firm that continues to operate independently is given in equation (5). Then any target
firm, (a, b), facing the realization of future productivity shocks, and the probability µ of meeting a
potential acquirer, exhibits a flow value of
T j(a, b) =
∫
Ψ
{
µ
J
J∫
1
[ bH∫
bL
Ga
(
A jh
)
S jh(A jh, b′, aψ, b)dGb(b′)
]
+
[
(1 − µ) + µ
J
J∫
1
bH∫
bL
[
1 −Ga
(
A jh
)]
dGb(b′)
]
V(aψ, b)
}
dF(ψ) (10)
The first term inside the braces is the value retained from a merger for the average potential
acquirer, weighted by the likelihood of acquisition, while the second term is the value of continuing
to operate independently, weighted by the likelihood of not being acquired, each evaluated for the
realization of ψ. These values are then aggregated across the potential realizations of ψ ∈ Ψ from
the distribution F(ψ).16
4.3. Equilibrium Export Behavior
In stage one, firms select which markets to serve in anticipation of shocks to their productivity,
and the likelihood of acquisition. Forward looking firms do not simply choose to export to markets
in which they currently earn non-negative profits. Recognizing the future impact of their export
behavior on the likelihood of acquisition, firms trade off increases in their value as a target firm in
(10), with the greater trade costs incurred when serving additional markets.
With our assumption that f j j = 0, firms will always operate domestically. However, since
fi j > 0, firms may not serve all potential destinations, i ∈ [1, J]. A firm from country j with initial
16Given that the productivity shocks, ln(1/ψ) are log-normally distributed, the distribution function F(ψ) can readily
be obtained using method of transformations.
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productivity parameter a, will choose to serve country i if, given future productivity shocks and the
likelihood of acquisition, the net benefits of exporting are non-negative. Note that for the ordered
set of export destinations D j, if a firm in country j chooses to serve market k, then it also will
export to all markets i ∈ D j such that cj fi jτ−1i j ≤ cj fk jτ−1k j . Thus, the export network of a firm
N j(a, b) is fully characterized by the export destination that is the most costly for it to enter, which
we denote k j(a, b) = sup N j(a, b). Optimal export decisions satisfy the following condition:
dT j(a, b)
dk j(a, b)
= bc j fk j(a,b) j , (11)
such that increasing the mass of export destinations of firm a to include destination k j(a) equates
the additional value earned by the target firm in (10) to the costs of entry into that market.
One of our key goals is to highlight the role of target firm exporting behavior in promoting
cross-border M&A activity. Equation (11) is useful in that it illustrates the relationship between
target firm characteristics and their endogenous choice to establish export networks, which affects
their value on M&A markets. Firms with greater productivity earn higher profits in each market
that they serve. Thus, the first implication of the condition in (11) is that firms with higher initial
productivity within each country will export to more markets. The greater propensity of high
productivity firms to export is now widely recognized; see for example Bernard & Jensen (1999).17
Second, firms with lower export network costs, b, set up larger export networks, conditional on
their productivity level a. While the role of firm-specific costs to set up networks is straightforward,
it is important to note here because it will be useful in identifying the impact of export networks on
cross-border M&A activity as target firm productivities change over time. Furthermore, Bernard
et al. (2003) provide evidence that, even after controlling for productivity, there is substantial
heterogeneity in export activity among plants, and Roberts & Tybout (1997) provide evidence that
such heterogeneity in plant-level export behavior over time is consistent with the presence of sunk
17A key difference here is that firms may choose to export to particular markets even if future productivity shocks
would make them potentially unprofitable to serve, given they retain the option of selling their export networks to high
productivity acquirers. This forward looking export behavior, in which firms may serve some fringe markets at a loss
in order to improve their valuation on acquisition markets, is distinct from the large literature on heterogeneous export
behavior.
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costs to enter foreign markets.
A third implication of equation (11) is that firms with the same level of productivity and net-
work setup costs, but from different countries, will establish different export networks because they
face a different set of fixed costs, factor costs, and transport costs from their particular location.
Thus, the location of country j can independently grant an advantage in exporting to particular
markets. For example, because of France’s proximity to other European markets, French firms
are likely to have an advantage relative to the U.S. in exporting to, say, Germany. The advantage
that firms within some countries possess in establishing particular trade networks can make them
attractive targets for cross-border M&A, independent of firm-specific characteristics.
5. Analysis of Cross-Border M&A activity
Purchasing a firm with a large export network, due to either greater initial productivity, lower
setup costs, or locational advantages, allows a foreign acquirer to use the target’s network as an ex-
port platform to countries that are otherwise unprofitable to serve. Several studies have suggested
that global patterns of FDI are consistent with multinationals locating in countries that serve as
effective export platforms to proximate markets, but ignored the role of cross-border M&A, and
the endogenous creation of export networks by target firms.18 Similarly, previous studies of cross-
border M&A activity have ignored export platforms as a potential motive. The following proposi-
tion demonstrates that target firms may appear to be “cherries” sought by multinationals on M&A
markets specifically because of their endogenous export behavior.
Proposition 1. Domestic firms that set up relatively large export networks are more likely to be
acquired by a foreign multinational firm.
Proof. Note that firms endowed with greater values of b set up smaller export networks, all else
equal. Then, the result is evident from the following:
dY jht(a, b)
db
= µ
Mh
MW
bH∫
bL
ga
(
A jh(a, b, b′)
)
dGb(b′)
dA jh(a, b, b′)
db
< 0
18Examples of studies of export platform FDI and spatial FDI flows are Hanson et al. (2001), Yeaple (2003), Lai &
Zhu (2006), Blonigen et al. (2007) and Ekholm et al. (2007).
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where dA jh(a,b,b
′)
db < 0 is the reduction in the mass of potential acquirers that generate a non-negative
surplus by acquiring firms with higher network set up costs. A analagous result is obtained by
considering export behavior that is due to differences in the initial levels of firm productivity.
The propensity of multinationals to acquire targets with highly valued export networks appears
to contradict the conventional wisdom that acquirers seek under-performing “lemons” as potential
targets. Here we argue that the seemingly opposing incentives to acquire high performing versus
low performing targets are in reality differences in the effect of productivity across the states of
firms’ assets. In our multi-period framework we can investigate the impact of firm productivity
changes, conditional on the initial investments in export networks, on the likelihood of acquisition.
Proposition 2. Firms that realize a persistent negative shock to their productivity level, after their
export networks have been established, are more likely to be acquired relative to other targets.
Proof. Recall that an increase in the productivity parameter a corresponds to a reduction in firm
productivity. The result states that dY jht(a,b)da
∣∣∣∣
N j(a,b)
> 0, where N j(a, b) is the export network estab-
lished conditional on its initial productivity, which we hold fixed. Calculating from equation (9)
directly we obtain
dY jht(a, b)
da
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N j(a,b)
= µ
Mh
MW
bH∫
bL
ga
(
A jh(a, b, b′)
)
dGb(b′)
dA jh(a, b, b′)
da
∣∣∣∣
N j(a,b)
> 0
where dA jh(a,b,b
′)
da
∣∣∣∣
N j(a,b)
> 0 is the increase in the mass of potential acquirers that generate a non-
negative surplus by acquiring firms that suffer negative productivity shocks, holding their initial
investments in export networks fixed.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate which types of firms are the preferred targets for multinational
firms engaging in cross-border M&A. Moreover, they predict when acquisitions are relatively more
likely to take place during the life cycles of target firms. We refer to the behavior of acquirers seek-
ing valuable assets, like export networks, and subsequently choosing to engage in M&A activity
after targets realize negative productivity shocks as multinationals acquiring “cherries for sale.”
It is important to note that the incentives to acquire firms with large export networks, con-
ditional on realizing a negative productivity shock, does not imply that firms with large export
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networks are relatively more likely to be acquired upon a loss in productivity; that is, a negative
productivity shock does not magnify the propensity to acquire firms that export to many destina-
tions. In an appendix we show that the joint effects of export activity and productivity changes
on the likelihood of acquisition activity (i.e., d
2Y jht(a,b)
dadb holding initial investments in export activity
constant) can generally be positive or negative. Although firms with both a large export network
and negative productivity shock look relatively more desirable, there may also be relatively fewer
potential acquirers who are profitable enough to make a successful takeover bid of a firm that had
high enough productivity to set up large export networks in the first place.19
It is worth emphasizing that the result in Proposition 2 would differ if firms realized a negative
shock before they established their export network. A firm that realizes a persistent productivity
shock prior to investing in exporting activity would subsequently choose to enter fewer markets
than the same firm would have prior to suffering a reduction in productivity. From the perspective
of an acquirer, a firm with a small export network would not be an attractive target because there is
less surplus generated from acquisition. Hence, shocks that precede investments in export activity
would not promote cross-border M&A, whereas shocks after sunk investments have been made do
promote acquisition activity.
Thus far we have emphasized the endogenous export behavior of heterogeneous firms in mo-
tivating cross-border M&A. The value of targets’ export networks can also vary as exogenous
geographical differences give rise to variation in trade costs across countries. The ability to serve
markets from locations that result in lower trade costs also provides a motive for multinationals to
engage in cross-border M&A, and use the target firm’s network as an export platform to proximate
markets.
Proposition 3. Given the ordering of trade costs across export destinations for any host country,
domestic targets are more likely to be acquired by foreign multinationals with higher trade costs
across the same ordered set of export destinations, in terms of stochastic dominance.
Proof. See Appendix
19We show in an appendix that if the distribution of firm productivities is Pareto (which has been shown to be a
good fit of firm size/productivity distributions in many countries) then the sign of d
2Y jht(a,b)
dadb is positive, holding initial
investments in export activity constant. We can also supply additional specifications from the empirical analysis that
confirm the positive cross-partial effect upon request.
21
All together, these results suggest distinct empirical strategies that examine target firm charac-
teristics across time, and across the locations of potential acquirers, to identify the roles of export
networks and productivity shocks in promoting cross-border M&A activity.
6. Empirical Strategy
In this section we use the theory above to derive our empirical strategy for detecting the impacts
of previous investments in export networks and recent productivity shocks on the likelihood of
foreign acquisition of domestic firms. The outcome variable of interest is the probability that a
domestic firm d in sector s is acquired by a foreign firm from location h at time t, conditional on its
initial productivity ad,t−2, current productivity, ad,t−1, and its specific costs to setup export networks,
bd, which we write Ydsht ≡ Pr(Acquisitiondt|ad,t−1, ad,t−2, bd). Note that, given the annual frequency
of observation, we indicate current firm-level characteristics as those observed in time period t− 1,
for a firm observed to be under new foreign ownership during time period t.
Specifying the current time period as t − 1 avoids erroneously attributing firm characteristics
that belong to an acquirer to be those of the target firm at any given time. Fich et al. (2011) provide
evidence that the length of M&A negotiations is approximately 120 days on average, and only 160
days at the upper quartile. Hence, allowing for a single year lag t − 1 in target firm characteristics
is likely to avoid the possibility that we are measuring changes in firm characteristics that are a
result of acquisition activity. Guadalupe et al. (2012) adopt a similar practice when studying the
consequences of acquisitions, and as we discuss below, we obtain qualitatively similar results if
we use further lagged values in the baseline specification. Here we denote the initial time period
as t − 2 to ease exposition as we derive the empirical strategy. The model is easily generalized to
a many period case, and all of our estimation results are robust to the inclusion of multiple time
periods in the empirical model.
We specify the conditional probability as having a logistical distribution
Ydsht = Λ(zdsht) + ξdsht ≡ exp(zdsht)1 − exp(zdsht) + ξdsht (12)
where we index the response probability to firm characteristics (ad,t−2, ad,t−1, bd), and other control
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variables Xdsht, as
zdsht = β0 − β1 ln(ad,t−2) − β2 ln(ad,t−1) + β3bd + Xdshtβ .
Noting that − ln(ad,t) is simply the observed ln T FPd,t for firm d at time t, given its productivity
parameter a, we can rewrite the index function above as
zdsht = β0 + β1 ln T FPd,t−2 + β2 ln T FPd,t−1 + β3bd + Xdshtβ . (13)
The firm-specific costs to enter foreign markets, bd, are not observed. It may also be the case
that the initial level of productivity for firm d corresponds to a time period before the sample pe-
riod begins. If the initial draws of productivity and export setup costs for each firm are unobserved
and not independent, then obtaining unbiased estimates of the impact of prior levels of firm-level
productivity in the model described by equations (12) and (13) is difficult, due to the well-known
initial conditions problem. Arellano & Carrasco (2003), Wooldridge (2005), and Honore & Tamer
(2006) discuss specifically the initial conditions problem in non-linear unobserved effects mod-
els, such as the logit specification in (12). The concern over estimated the role of unobserved
firm-specific attributes is exacerbated in the context of prior investments in export capacity by the
evidence in Roberts & Tybout (1997) that there is significant variation in sunk costs across plants,
and that sunk costs explain a large amount of variation in observed export activity across firms.
Even though the firm-specific parameters, bd, are not observed, the theory above predicts that
initial firm-level productivity and the firm-specific costs to enter markets impact the likelihood
of acquisition through a target firm’s choice to establish export networks. Specifically, the (log)
number of export destinations, ln ExpNetdt−2, established previously by targets can be written
ln ExpNetdt−2 = γ0 + γ1 ln T FPdt−2 + γ2bd . (14)
The optimal export behavior described in equation (11), as well as a large empirical literature,
demonstrate that high productivity firms are more engaged in export activity and that sunk costs
are significant in explaining variation in export activity across firms and time; see Bernard &
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Jensen (1999), Bernard et al. (2003) and Roberts & Tybout (1997). Thus we have γ1 > 0, as
more productive firms export to a greater number of destinations, and γ2 < 0, as large setup costs
deter target firms from exporting to foreign markets. To ease exposition we write equation (14)
such that firms make sunk investments in a single time period prior to the current year, however
(14) can generally be specified dynamically, so that it includes measures of previous levels of firm
productivity. We will report the results of specifications that account for this possibility, and show
that our results remain robust.
From an empirical point of view equation (14) is useful in that it provides an observable firm
characteristic, export networks, that explicitly accounts for the conditional distribution of initial
productivity and unobserved costs to enter each market for each firm. Then, solving (14) for bd,
and substituting into the index function in (13), we obtain
zdsht =
(
β0 − β3γ0
γ2
)
+
(
β1 − β3γ1
γ2
)
ln T FPd,t−2 + β2 ln T FPd,t−1
+
β3
γ2
ln ExpNetdt−2 + Xdshtβ . (15)
It is also useful to note that firm-level productivities (in logs) evolve through time as a random
walk. Our sample confirms that firm productivity evolves according to a random walk. The coef-
ficient of a regression of the contemporaneous TFP on lagged TFP is 1.01. In accordance with the
assumptions of the model we also find that log TFP evolves according to a random walk, with a
coefficient of 0.98 when we regress lnTFP on it lagged value. Thus we can write
ln T FPdt−1 = ln T FPdt−2 + ln(1/ψ)dt−1 (16)
where ∆ ln T FPd,t−1 ≡ ln(1/ψ)dt−1 is the firm-level shock to a target’s productivity level, after it
has invested in creating valuable assets such as export networks. Finally, we can substitute the
relationship in equation (16), into the response probability in (15), and simplifying notation for
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parameters (β and γ) we obtain
zdsht = θ0 + θ1ExpNetd,t−2 + θ2∆ ln T FPd,t−1 + θ3 ln T FPd,t−1 + XsdhtΘ . (17)
Together the logit model in (12), and the derived index function in (17), characterize our empirical
strategy.
The theory above predicts that previous investments in export networks, measured as ExpNetd,t−2,
promote cross-border M&A activity. Thus the predicted sign of θ1 is positive. Proposition 3 makes
further predictions about the effect of export networks across sub-samples of acquiring countries.
While locational differences and trade costs make export networks of domestic targets valuable to
foreign acquirers, potential acquirers from the domestic country will already export to a similar set
of markets. Redundancy in the export networks of domestic targets should make them relatively
less valuable to domestic acquirers. To evaluate this prediction we estimate a multinomial logit
model for the likelihood of foreign versus domestic acquisition, relative to the excluded group of
firms that are not acquired. Proposition 3 predicts that in the multinomial logit regression, the
marginal effect of export networks is positive for foreign acquirers, and equal to zero for domestic
acquirers. To further evaluate the role of export networks across the locations of acquirers, we es-
timate the logit model separately for the sub-sample of foreign acquisitions from nearby countries
(European nations) and the sub-sample of acquisitions from far-away countries (Non-European
nations). The prediction is that non-European countries will value the export networks established
by French targets more that acquirers from nearby countries.20
Investments in export networks cause domestic firms to appear as high value cherries to foreign
acquirers, making them more likely targets for takeover. Our model also makes predictions as
to when target firms that invest in export capacity are more likely to be acquired. Proposition 2
predicts that reductions in firm-level productivity after investments in establishing export networks,
20As we discuss in detail below, because we estimate the relative likelihood of acquisition using a non-linear multi-
nomial logit model, the prediction that the marginal impact of export networks on the likelihood of acquisition by
non-European firms is larger than for European firms does not require that θEUR1 < θ
Non−EUR
1 . Instead we will focus on
the relative magnitudes of the marginal effects for each group. We then compare the marginal effects evaluated at the
respective sample means of observed export networks.
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∆ ln T FPd,t−1, increase the likelihood of acquisition. A negative sign for θ2 indicates propensity to
seek targets who are currently “for sale” on domestic M&A markets. The specification of our
empirical model incorporating lagged firm characteristics allows us to simultaneously estimate
the impact of previous investments in valuable assets such as export networks and the impact of
reductions in firm productivity over time. Estimates such that θ1 > 0 and θ2 < 0 indicate that
cross-border M&A activity is characterized by multinationals seeking “cherries for sale.”
Our theory makes no prediction about how the current level of TFP of a target firm impacts
the likelihood of acquisition once we condition on previous productivity shocks and established
export networks of a target firm; with productivities evolving according to a random walk, the
shock to firm productivity, ∆ ln T FPd,t−1, is sufficient to characterize how the outside option of
producing independently with its own productivity level, ln T FPd,t−1, has changed for each target
firm. Yet, our model only considers the ex ante role of firm productivity in promoting investments
in assets such as export networks. Guadalupe et al. (2012) show that the current TFP level of a
domestic target firm is positively associated with the likelihood of foreign acquisition, because of
ex post investments in technologies made by the acquirer. They argue that these investments are
complementary to the current productivity of a target firm. In line with their findings we expect to
find that θ3 > 0.
The vector Xdsht contains several additional control variables that might promote cross-border
M&A activity independently. Heyman et al. (2007) show that foreign acquirers seek targets with
relatively high skill workers, suggesting that integration of the acquiring firm technology may be
a skill-bias activity. We include controls for the skill intensity of the workforce of target firms,
and accordingly expect that a more skill intensive workforce will increase the likelihood of foreign
takeover. Firms may possess other intangible assets that make them attractive as targets as well. For
example, Blonigen & Taylor (2000) argue that firms can use M&A to substitute for costly research
and development. Lee (2011) argues that cross-border M&A is motivated by firms seeking specific
technologies, and Nocke & Yeaple (2008) highlight the incentives for takeover of firms which
possess strong market potential. We include a set of intangible assets, such as R&D expenditure
and goodwill, to account for these distinct motivations for foreign acquisition. Finally, Desai et al.
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(2004) demonstrate that multinational firms have access to internal credit markets across countries
that may alleviate financial conditions among affiliate firms. This presence of credit constraints
among target firms which could independently motivate acquisition by a multinational firm. We
include a measure of credit constraints faced by French firms, Payment Incidents, to account for
this alternative incentive to engage in cross-border M&A.
We also include time specific effects, τt, which capture aggregate macroeconomic conditions of
the economy that may affect M&A activity. For example, the timing of acquisitions typically ebbs
and flows in merger waves, even if motivated by economic fundamentals; see Harford (2005). We
include sector-specific effects for each 4-digit sector level. A sector fixed effects strategy accounts
for fixed differences in cross-border M&A activity, as well as fixed differences in export activity
within the host country across sectors.
Although the lagged values of export networks will account for firm specific costs to enter
foreign markets, including firm-specific effects still may be useful. We have specified the evolu-
tion of firm-level productivity as a random walk, where each firm realizes shocks drawn from the
same distribution. In practice, firms may draw productivity shocks from distributions with differ-
ent amounts of drift, leading to differences in the propensity of firms to accept similar takeover
bids, independent of their specific attributes a and b. Thus we will also report estimates from
specifications that include firm-fixed effects.21
7. Data
While section 2 above described some of the primary data we have and how we construct our
measures of TFP and export networks, we next describe the additional data that we employ in our
econometric analysis. These additional data provide the important control variables (mentioned
above) that may also affect cross-border M&A activity and which we want to include in order to
avoid spurious inferences.
Data regarding workers and occupations come from the “DADS Panel”–Declaration Annuelle
21Without firm-level fixed effects, the appropriate counter-factual is the observed export networks and changes in
TFP for acquired firms, relative to non-acquired firms. In specifications that include firm fixed effects we exclude
non-acquired firms and examine differences target firm characteristics before and after the time of acquisition.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
Whole Sample Acquired Foreign Affiliates
Foreign Affiliate [1/0] 32883 0.092 0.289 2728 0.470 0.499
ln(Export Network)t−2 32883 1.798 1.224 2728 2.338 1.117
∆ ln(TFP)t−1 32883 0.030 0.231 2728 0.040 0.236
∆ ln(TFP)t−2 25363 0.037 0.230 2213 0.049 0.246
ln(TFP)t−1 32883 3.940 1.042 2728 4.508 1.099
Share of Intangiblet−1 32883 0.109 0.160 2632 0.136 0.193
Skill Intensityt−1 32883 0.306 0.190 2679 0.369 0.207
Payment Incidentst−1 32883 0.029 1.073 2728 0.245 3.182
Ile de France 32883 0.196 0.394 2728 0.250 0.433
de Donne´es Sociales, an employer-employee dataset collected by the INSEE (Institut National de
la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques).22 The DADS report mandatory information on all de-
clared employees including the number of yearly hours worked, wages and occupation. The French
classification of occupations identifies skilled and unskilled workers. Skill groups correspond to
the 2-digit French Classification of Occupations and Social Categories. We divide these categories
into two groups: skilled non-production workers (executives, technicians, administrative occupa-
tions, clerks) and production workers. We compute the skill intensity at firm-level as the share of
hours worked by skilled non-production workers in the total number of hours worked. Information
on the value of intangible and tangible assets are taken from the BRN (Be´ne´fice Re´el Normal -
ordinary actual profit), a mandatory tax form for any firm with revenue larger than 763,000 euros
in manufacturing. The share of intangible assets is simply the ratio of intangible assets to total
assets.
We identify financially constrained firms by exploiting a database derived from regulatory con-
straints in the French banking system. Since 1992, banks are legally obligated to report any incident
22This data is a yearly notification of social data filled by any firm with employees. Information on age, gender,
experience, occupation, sector, region, firm identifier, plant size, compensation.
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of a firm failing to pay its creditors within four business days. These defaults on credits are called
Payment Incidents. Banks use this information to adapt their supply of credit to firms, so that
observed payment incidents are informative about the potential access to credit for French target
firms.23 The Banque de France collects this information and makes 12-month histories available
freely to all commercial banks and other credit institutions. We make use of the historical series,
and compute the total value of incidents, within a year, for each firm since 2000. The matching
with our data is permitted by the use of a common administrative ID for the firm. A full description
of the sample construction is provided in the Appendix.
Table 1 provides simple summary statistics for each variable used in estimation for the sample
of all foreign affiliates, as well as the sample of targets which we observed being newly acquired
by foreign multinationals. We will employ two samples. The first is a sample that is composed of
domestic firms that have become foreign owned during the sample period, as well as French firms
that did not change their ownership over 1999-2006. We accordingly drop all observations for (i)
firms acquired by French firms after becoming foreign owned, (ii) independent firms acquired by
French groups, (iii) firms that have always been foreign owned from 1999-2006, and (iv) French
groups acquired by French groups. The corresponding sample is composed of 32,883 observations.
Descriptive statistics for our variables with this sample are in the left columns of Table 1. When
we introduce fixed effects in a logit estimation, we reduce the sample to only those French firms
that were acquired by a foreign firms at some point in our sample. This reduces our sample size
to 2,728 observations and descriptive statistics for this sample are reported in the right columns of
Table 1.24
23There are several reasons we would observe payment incidents, ranging from a material error to an actual default
of payment. We select cases corresponding to insufficient liquidity of the debtor and drop cases related to material
error or contested claims. These data have been used in several previous studies to identify financial constraints among
firms. See for example Aghion et al. (2012) and Bricongne et al. (2012).
24In the appendix, we show comparisons of TFP levels, employment and trade volumes between foreign-owned
and domestic firms. In line with previous studies foreign-owned firms (unconditionally) exhibit higher productivity,
employ more workers, pay higher wages, and trade more than their domestic counterparts.
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8. Results
The section is divided into five parts corresponding to our different empirical strategies: (i)
we focus on the export networks and productivity changes at acquired targets relative to firms
that are never acquired; (ii) we incorporate firm-level fixed effects into the empirical model and
analyze export networks and productivity shocks within acquired targets prior to their acquisition;
(iii) we reconsider alternative specifications of export networks that also account for the number of
products exported by each target; (iv) we compare firm characteristics across those that are targets
for domestic versus multinational acquirers; and (v) we provide evidence that the role of export
networks varies across the acquiring firm’s country of origin, as predicted by the model.
8.1. Evidence Comparing Targets to Non-Acquired Firms
The estimation results from the sector fixed effects logistic regression are given in Table 2. The
reported values correspond to the marginal effects evaluated at sample means. All specifications
include 4-digit sector fixed effects and year effects.
Looking across each specification in Table 4 we find strong evidence that previously established
export networks provide significant motivation for cross-border M&A activity. In column (1) we
include only the export characteristics of a firm, defined as the number of countries to which a firm
exports. In columns (4)-(6), we introduce other firm level characteristics that may independently
motivate foreign acquisition. Even after controlling for these other firm-level characteristics the
established trade networks have a significant impact on the likelihood of acquisition.
The effect of the export characteristics of target firms is quantitatively significant as well. Based
on the preferred estimates from columns (5) and (6) that include a full set of controls, a standard
deviation increase in a firm’s export network (about a 66% increase) raises its likelihood of being
acquired by 0.54 percentage points. With an average probability of foreign acquisition of 1.5% in
each year, an export network that is a standard deviation above the mean implies approximately
a roughly a 33% greater likelihood in the probability of foreign acquisition. In other words, the
pseudo-elasticity between changes in export networks and the likelihood of acquisition is near 0.5.
Another way to consider the quantitative impact of export networks is to note that the average
number of markets served among French firms is approximately 12. Thus, exporting to even a
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Table 2: Results: Logistic Estimation with Sector Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(ExportNetwork)t−2 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆ ln(TFP)t−1 -0.001 -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
ln(TFP)t−1 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Intangiblet−1 0.025* 0.032*
(0.013) (0.016)
Share of Skillt−1 0.107*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.018)
Payment Incidentst−1 0.003* 0.006
(0.002) (0.005)
Ile de France -0.017*** -0.017**
(0.006) (0.008)
∆ ln(TFP)t−2 -0.004
(0.006)
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 32,883 32,883 32,883 32,883 32,883 25,063
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.104 0.158 0.162 0.175 0.175
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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single additional market is roughly equivalent to a 10% larger export network, corresponding to a
5% increase in the likelihood of acquisition.
It is worth noting that the positive effect of export networks is maintained even when we in-
troduce measures of firm TFP levels. The well-known stylized fact is that high-productivity firms
invest in exporting capacity more than those with lower productivity, as they are better able to cover
fixed exporting costs.25 However, the fact that we find a positive and robust impact of previous ex-
porting behavior after controlling for TFP levels is consistent with our assertion in the theory above
that investments in export capacity are, at least in part, sunk costs. Targets are more attractive for
having established export networks, even after controlling for differences in their ability to do so
in the future.
The second hypothesis from the model is that negative productivity shocks increase the sur-
plus generated by a merger, further motivating cross-border M&A. In column (2) we include only
the measured change in productivity experienced in the previous year. As expected, without con-
trolling for potentially valuable assets held by the target, productivity shocks have no estimated
impact on the likelihood of foreign acquisition. Proposition 2 states that negative shocks promote
cross-border M&A when other firm characteristics are held fixed. Once we account for other firm-
level characteristics we obtain a strong and robust negative impact of productivity shocks on the
probability of being acquired by a foreign multinational.
The negative coefficient on the lagged changes in productivity in columns (4)-(6) suggest that
a productivity shock that is 10% above average corresponds to 0.13 percentage point increase, or
equivalently about a 8.6% increase, in the probability of foreign acquisition. We observe large
differences in productivity shocks across firms in our sample; See Table (1). Thus, the estimated
pseudo-elasticity of 0.86 suggests substantial differences in the likelihood of foreign acquisition
for firms that receive various shocks to their productivity in each year.
One may be concerned that additional lags in productivity, or more specifically previous shocks
to firm-level TFP, may also promote takeover in the current period. Our empirical model described
in equations (12) and (17) can easily be generalized to accommodate further lags in firm charac-
25See for example Bernard & Jensen (1999).
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teristics. With productivity evolving according to a random walk, this is equivalent to including
additional lagged values of TFP shocks. In column (6) we introduce an additional measure of
previous shocks, ∆ ln T FPt−2 , and find that it has no effect. Predetermined export activity and the
latest shock to target-firm productivity appear to be sufficient in describing the changes within
target firms that promote cross-border M&A activity.
In the theory we have assumed that all shocks to firm productivity are persistent. Indeed our
sample of French firms provides strong evidence that productivity evolves according to a random
walk. However, it may be possible that some shocks are only temporary. We have estimated each
specification in Table 2, where shocks that are relatively small (less than a half of a standard devi-
ation) are normalized to zero, as these small shocks may be more likely to be viewed as temporary
by potential acquirers. We find identical quantitative results when only large shocks are considered.
Complementary results to Table 2, using instead labor productivity, also yield identical qualitative
results and are available from the authors upon request.
All of the estimated effects of other firm-level characteristics are in line with previous find-
ings. Firms with a relatively more skill-intensive workforce are more likely to be acquired, as are
those with a substantial share of intangible assets. The positive coefficient on TFP levels is consis-
tent with the previous evidence from many other countries, including Chile, Indonesia, the U.S.,
and Spain. The regression results which account other firm characteristics confirm the patterns
illustrated in Figure 1; none of the regression results in Table 2 are affected by the inclusion of
additional firm-level controls.
A final concern about the estimated effects in Table 2 may be that there is reverse causality
such that targets strategically lower their productivity in anticipation of a future merger. Yet, Fich
et al. (2011) reports evidence from administrative filings that, even at the upper quartile, the length
of M&A negotiations, from the time of first contact to completion, is approximately 160 days or
less. The one year lag on productivity levels and shock is likely to be immune to bias from reverse
causality if managers were to alter target firm characteristics in anticipation of a merger. Moreover,
there is little reason to think that managers may strategically manipulate their balance sheets in a
way that would lower their TFP, even if it promotes takeover. Targets that suffer productivity
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shocks are more likely to be acquired because a greater share of potential acquirers that can make
a successful takeover bid. Lower productivity does not improve the strike price of acquisitions, nor
the option of operating independently if a potential acquisition fails. As seen in equation (10), a
target firm’s valuation is increasing in its productivity. And in practice, executives are compensated
by equity stakes and stock options that are more valuable when strike prices are high; see Fich et al.
(2011) and Heitzman (2011). The incentives of managers to strategically increase productivity, and
therefore the raise strike prices of acquisitions, only works against our results in Table 2. Finally,
to further assuage concerns about reverse causality or anticipation of acquisition contaminating our
estimates we have also run the model with additional lags. Specifying the model estimated in Table
2 with additional lags, which considers productivity shocks two full years prior to acquisition and
export networks established three years prior to acquisitions, yields identical qualitative results.
8.2. Evidence Looking Within Acquired Targets
In this section, we incorporate firm-level fixed effects to estimate the impact of target firm char-
acteristics on the probability of switching from French to foreign ownership status. There are two
reasons that we wish to estimate (12) with firm-level fixed effects. First, one may be concerned that
the positive effect reported in the previous section for established export networks is actually due
to the formation of other unobserved assets that are correlated with investments in export activity.
Incorporating firm fixed effects accounts for any independent, but unobserved, M&A determinants
that are specific to the firm and time invariant. Second, looking within acquired firms we are able
to identify the distinct effects of export networks and productivity shocks, consistent with acqui-
sition activity where multinationals seek cherries for sale. It is possible that the previous results
from the sector-fixed effects specification are due to two distinct groups of acquired firms: those
with negative productivity shocks and those with large export networks.26 The sample reduces to
512 acquired targets and 2,728 observations over the sample period. Again, the treatment group
in the sample is the set of firms acquired by foreign multinationals, but the control group for this
empirical strategy is composed of French firms before the year of acquisition.
26Of course Figure 1 allays such concerns, since the entire distribution of acquired targets, from the 5th-95th per-
centile in productivity, suffer losses prior to acquisition, in addition to having a larger than average export network.
34
Table 3: Logistic Estimation with Firm Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(ExportNetwork)t−2 1.097*** 1.080*** 0.936*** 0.732***
(0.193) (0.193) (0.230) (0.267)
∆ ln(TFP)t−1 -0.581*** -0.526*** -2.145*** -3.488***
(0.193) (0.195) (0.328) (0.684)
ln(TFP)t−1 3.916*** 5.560***
(0.595) (1.015)
Share of Intangiblet−1 4.764*** 5.882**
(1.537) (2.348)
Share of Skillt−1 13.247*** 10.377***
(1.967) (2.358)
Payment Incidentst−1 -0.019 -0.026
(0.020) (0.054)
Ile de France -2.735*** -15.184***
(0.929) (0.732)
∆ ln(TFP)t−2 -2.288***
(0.503)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,601 1,587
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.006 0.033 0.218 0.201
No. of Switchers 512 512 512 498 352
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3 provides additional support for the positive impact of previously established export
networks, and the effects of negative productivity shocks, in promoting cross-border M&A activity.
The inclusion of firm-level fixed effects precludes calculations of marginal effects, but looking
within acquired targets the coefficient on the number of previously established export destinations
continues to be positive and significant, consistent with the positive marginal effect reported in
Table 2.27 In Table 3 we also continue to find that negative productivity shocks encourage takeover.
27In Table 3 we continue to report estimates from specifications that use export networks observed two years prior to
acquisition, as in Table 2. However we find nearly identical results if we use earlier observations (t−3 or t−4) from each
acquired target. Recall that Figure 1 shows that the export networks among target firms grow following acquisition,
and Guadalupe et al. (2012) find that foreign multinationals make significant investments in export capacity following
takeover of Spanish firms. Note that this formation of new nodes on the export network of acquired firms only works
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Now that we examine productivity changes within individual acquired firms, we find that further
lags in changes to TFP may also contribute to the probability of acquisition by foreign firms (see
column (5)), however with firm-level fixed effects we cannot discern whether the additional lag has
significant marginal impact on the likelihood of acquisition.28
8.3. Alternative Specifications
So far we have presented evidence that the number of countries to which a target firm exports
will positively affect its likelihood of acquisition by a foreign multinational. This specification
of export networks is consistent with the evidence in Arkolakis & Muendler (2011, 2013) that
exporting activity is strongly fragmented across national markets. On the other hand, Bernard
et al. (2011) argue that firms may make different export decisions for different products in their
portfolio if there are product specific costs to establish export networks. The theory above also
predicts that the additional product line manufactured by target firms may contribute to the surplus
generated by a merger, and hence alter the likelihood of foreign acquisition. In this section we
examine the cherry effect of established export networks on cross-border M&A activity, looking
across the number of export destinations, number of products exported, and number of product-
destination pairs.
Table 4 provides evidence that export networks, defined as product-destination pairs, promote
foreign acquisition. Columns (1)-(2) report estimated marginal effects from specifications that
include 4-digit sector fixed effects. Columns (3)-(4) report the coefficient estimates from specifica-
tions that include firm-level fixed effects. In columns (5)-(6) we decompose the product-destination
pairs and include the number of countries that a target exports to, and the number of products
exported, independently. The estimates in columns (1)-(4), which define export network as the
number of country-product pairs, are consistent with the predicted cherry effects of export behav-
ior on the likelihood of foreign acquisition: larger export networks promote foreign acquisition.
However, in columns (5) and (6) we find that the number of countries to which a target exports
is the key feature of its export behavior that attracts foreign acquirers. After controlling for the
against finding a positive effect of previous export behavior on the likelihood of foreign acquisition.
28In column (5) the number of observations drops due to the introduction of additional lagged variables.
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Table 4: Alternative Specifications of Export Networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Export 0.004** 0.004* 0.619*** 0.362*
Network)CPit−2 (0.002) (0.002) (0.166) (0.198)
ln(Export 0.011*** 0.834***
Network)Cit−2 (0.004) (0.292)
ln(Export -0.004 -0.225
Network)Pit−2 (0.004) (0.209)
∆ ln(TFP)it−1 -0.014*** -0.014** -2.154*** -3.545*** -0.014** -3.501***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.326) (0.675) (0.007) (0.683)
∆ ln(TFP)it−2 -0.004 -2.336*** -0.004 -2.321***
(0.006) (0.493) (0.006) (0.502)
ln(TFP)t−1 0.034*** 0.038*** 3.966*** 5.657*** 0.038*** 5.589***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.591) (0.995) (0.004) (1.009)
Share of 0.026** 0.033** 4.907*** 6.015** 0.032** 5.963**
Intangiblet−1 (0.013) (0.016) (1.524) (2.362) (0.016) (2.363)
Share of 0.110*** 0.120*** 13.186*** 10.276*** 0.119*** 10.272***
Skillt−1 (0.015) (0.018) (1.945) (2.299) (0.018) (2.316)
Payment 0.003* 0.007 -0.021 -0.027 0.007 -0.024
Incidentst−1 (0.002) (0.005) (0.020) (0.052) (0.005) (0.050)
Ile de France -0.017** -0.017** -2.799*** -14.03*** -0.017** -15.25***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.927) (0.706) (0.008) (0.707)
Sector FE yes yes no no yes no
Firm FE no no yes yes no yes
Year Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 32,883 25,063 2,601 1,587 25,063 1,587
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.174 0.213 0.194 0.175 0.200
No. Switchers . . 498 352 . 352
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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number destination markets, the number of products exported by a target has no significant impact
on the likelihood of acquisition. Consistent with the model above, investments made in the ability
to serve foreign markets attracts multinational acquirers.
The regression models estimated in Table 4 generate similar goodness-of-fit regardless of how
the export networks are specified; note that the pseudo-R2 is nearly the same across definitions of
export networks in Tables 2 and 3. As a basis of comparison note that the specification in column
(2) of Table 4 is equivalent to the specification in column (6) of Table 2 for the corresponding
definitions of export networks. The marginal effect of a larger export network defined as product-
destination pair is nearly half the estimated effect of an increase in the number of foreign markets
served; i.e., the elasticity with respect to the the number of product-destination pairs is approxi-
mately 0.4 versus an elasticity of the probability of foreign acquisition with respect to the number
of export destinations estimated to be 0.8. The fact that both the statistical and economic impacts of
the number of products exported are small further confirms that the number of countries to which a
firm exports is the key aspect of its export behavior on the M&A market. From this point forward
we will continue to define a target’s export network according the number of export destinations.
In Figure 1, and in each of the preceding empirical specifications, we measure productivity
shocks among target firms using estimated firm-level TFP that is obtained from the well-known
procedure offered in Olley & Pakes (1996). As an alternative to this structural approach to measure
firm-level performance, in Table 5 we consider observed firm-level market shares. Specifically, we
calculate the total revenue for each target firm earned in the domestic (French) market divided by
the total domestic revenue of all firms in the same 4-digit sector. Column (1) of Table 5 presents
the results of our preferred specification including sector fixed effects (corresponding to the results
with firm-level TFP in Table 2), while Column (2) presents the results of our preferred specification
including firm-level fixed effects (corresponding to the results in Table 3).
In both specifications that use firm-level market share as an alternative to TFP, we continue
to find results consistent with the cherries for sale behavior in cross-border M&A activity. The
positive marginal effect on the export network variable, which is significant at the one percent
level, indicates that acquirers indeed seek a targets that serve multiple foreign markets. Moreover,
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Table 5: Market Share as Alternative Measure of Firm Performance
Logit Logit FE
(1) (2)
ln(ExportNetwork)t−2 0.008*** 0.726***
(0.002) (0.210)
∆ ln(MarketShare)t−1 -0.007*** -0.281**
(0.001) (0.138)
ln(MarketShare)t−1 0.016*** 0.635***
(0.002) (0.222)
Share of Intangiblet−1 0.014 3.843***
(0.013) (1.457)
Share of Skillt−1 0.087*** 12.958***
(0.013) (2.093)
Payment Incidentst−1 -0.002** -0.074
(0.001) (0.048)
Ile de France -0.012** -2.797***
(0.006) (0.651)
Observations 31,042 2,057
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.142
Sector FE yes no
Year Effects yes yes
Firm FE no yes
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
using changes in market share to indicate changes in firm-level performance, we continue to find
that negative shocks promote takeover of French targets by foreign multinationals. The estimated
effect of firm-level shocks, as measured by changes in market share, is significant at high degrees
of confidence. This fact further confirms that the timing of acquisition corresponds to targets being
‘on sale’ relative to their prior valuation.
8.4. Export Networks and Geographical Differences
The previous two sections considered how the export behavior of target firms, and changes to
their productivity, influence cross-border M&A behavior. Thus far we have not distinguished the
export decisions that are due to endogenous investments by heterogeneous firms from the export
decisions that are due to exogenous geographical advantages. Proposition 3 suggests that greater
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locational differences between target and acquiring firms enhance the probability of a foreign ac-
quisition. In this section we take two different approaches to investigate how the cherry effect of
export networks varies across geographical locations of acquiring firms. First, all domestic firms
face the same costs associated with serving any foreign market. Thus, the export behavior of any
target firm should be relatively less attractive to domestic acquirers, whose similar investments in
export capacity make the target’s network redundant, as compared to foreign acquirers. Second,
countries that are far away from the domestic country are likely to face higher trade costs asso-
ciated with serving markets proximate to the domestic country. Therefore, investments in export
networks by domestic (French) targets should be more attractive to acquirers that are far away
(non-European) relative to those that are nearby (European).29
8.4.1. Domestic versus Foreign Acquisitions
Figure 1 shows that the targets that are acquired by foreign multinational firms have relatively
large export networks compared to other firms operating in the same sector. Another informative
comparison is to consider the export networks among targets acquired by foreign versus domestic
firms. On average, a French target that is acquired by a domestic firm (i.e., another French firm)
serves 6.8 countries, whereas targets that are acquired by foreign multinationals serve 10.38 dif-
ferent countries prior to acquisition. In other words, the export network among targets that are
acquired by foreign multinationals is approximately 65% larger on average, consistent with the
predictions of the model.
In Table 6 we use a multinomial logit regression to estimate the relative effect of trade networks
on the probabilities of foreign acquisition, domestic acquisition or no acquisition conditional on a
full set of firm-level controls, plus sector and year effects.30 Table 6 reports the marginal effects
of each regressor evaluated at the means from the entire sample. The excluded group in our re-
gressions is the set of domestic acquisitions so that the marginal effects Table 6 can be directly
29Other factors such as language, legal origins and institutional quality have been shown to impact trade costs, in
addition to distance. Since it it difficult to observe the actual trade costs incurred by individual firms, and across all
countries, our strategy is to consider stark differences such as domestic versus foreign, and European versus non-
European.
30Within each year and 4-digit sector there is a small number of acquisitions observed, and even fewer observations
of either domestic or foreign acquisitions. Given the small number of observations we incorporate 2-digit sector fixed
effects, rather that 4-digit, when estimating the multinomial logit regression in Table 6.
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Table 6: Foreign versus Domestic Acquisition: Multinomial Logit Results
Non-Acquired Foreign Acquisition
ln(Export Network)it−2 -0.006*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
∆ ln(TFP)it−1 0.025*** -0.009**
(0.009) (0.004)
ln(TFP)it−1 -0.038*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.001)
Share of Intangibleit−1 -0.078*** 0.007
(0.018) (0.006)
Share of Skillit−1 -0.108*** 0.044***
(0.017) (0.005)
Payment Incidentsit−1 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ile de France 0.031*** -0.007***
(0.007) (0.002)
Sector FE yes yes
Year Effects yes yes
Observations 36,962
Pseudo R2 0.038
Excluded group includes firms that are acquired by French acquirers.
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
interpreted as effects relative to this excluded group.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows that smaller export networks and larger TFP gains are associated
with a greater likelihood of not being acquired relative to the probability of a domestic acquisition.
Thus, domestic firms are attracted, like foreign firms, to cherries for sale to some extent. However,
column (2) shows that the ”cherries for sale” effect is larger (as hypothesized) for foreign acqui-
sitions. Greater export networks and TFP declines increase the probability of foreign acquisition
relative to the probability of a domestic acquisition. In other words, large export and distribution
networks among targets attract takeover bids (as prescribed by Proposition 1), but are significantly
more likely to attract foreign takeover bids from firms that originate in other countries and face
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different trade costs (as prescribed by Proposition 3).31 It is interesting that we find that negative
productivity shocks increase the likelihood of takeover by both foreign and domestic acquirers.
The propensity of domestic acquirers to acquire primarily financially troubled and underperform-
ing ‘lemons’ is consistent to previous evidence from US manufacturing in Lichtenberg & Siegel
(1987).
8.4.2. Differences across Acquirer Origins
The model above makes predictions about cross-border M&A activity in a multi-country world.
Given the differences in the costs of creating export networks across locations, the surplus gener-
ated from acquisition by a foreign multinational is much larger when it faces substantially different
trade costs. The distribution of variable trade costs across countries is not observed directly. Yet,
standard gravity models provide strong evidence that physical distance is a significant and robust
barrier to trade; see for example Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), among many others. Thus,
multinationals that originate in countries far from the domestic market should value locally es-
tablished export networks relatively more - in other words, export networks should be a stronger
attractor of foreign investors who are more distant from the target firm’s location.
To examine this, we explore whether an impact of export networks on the likelihood of acqui-
sition by multinationals that originate from (near) European countries is lower than for those that
originate from (far away) non-European countries.32 Similar to the differences between targets of
domestic versus foreign acquisitions in the raw data, there are also substantial differences in the
typical export networks among targets that are acquired by European versus non-European firms.
Targets of acquisition by nearby European firms on average sell in 5.9 countries, while targets of
non-European acquirers serve 14.0 different markets prior to acquisition. To verify the robustness
of this difference in average export network size, Table 7 reports estimates obtained from a multi-
31Nocke & Yeaple (2008) argue that the market potential of a target firm is an asset particular to its domestic
market. While here we find that the locational advantage of domestic targets is tied to the potential to serve other
foreign markets.
32There are 16 European members in the sample to which we add Liechtenstein, Monaco and the Netherlands and
United Kingdom Possessions. (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). The group of non-European members is
composed by Australia Canada, India, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia,
USA, and Venezuela.
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Table 7: European versus Non-European Foreign Acquisition: Multinomial Logit Results
Non-Acquired Non-European Acquisition
ln(Export Network)it−2 -0.007*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
∆ ln(TFP)it−1 0.013*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.002)
ln(TFP)it−1 -0.031*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.001)
Share of Intangibleit−1 -0.023* 0.007
(0.014) (0.007)
Share of Skillit−1 -0.115*** 0.026***
(0.013) (0.007)
Payment Incidentsit−1 0.003** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Ile de France 0.018*** 0.001
(0.006) (0.003)
Sector FE yes yes
Year Effects yes yes
Observations 34,946
Pseudo R2 0.1135
Excluded group includes firms that are acquired by European acquirers.
Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses.
***, **, * significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
nomial logit regression with sector fixed-effects, where the omitted group is the set of target firms
that acquired by European multinational firms. We include the full set of controls and report the
marginal effects of each regressor evaluated at the entire sample mean.
In column (2) of Table 7 we find significant evidence (at the one percent level) that larger ex-
port networks increase the likelihood of being acquired by a far away non-European multinational
firm, relative to the likelihood of being acquired by a nearby European multinational firm. The evi-
dence in Table 7 is consistent with prediction in Proposition 3, suggesting that there are significant
differences in role of exporting behavior by target firms in motivating cross-border M&A across
the location of acquiring firms.
The evidence in Table 7 also continues to support that multinational firms seek cherries for sale
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when engaging in cross-border acquisition activity. In column (1), we see that negative productivity
shocks increase the likelihood that a firm is acquired by a foreign multinational relative to the
likelihood of not being acquired; as evidenced by the positive coefficient on ∆ ln(TFP)it−1 , increases
in productivity raise the likelihood of non-acquisition relative to foreign takeover by European
firms. And while negative productivity shocks promote acquisition activity by multinationals from
both European and non-European countries, column (2) reports that the effect of these shocks does
not differ significantly according to country of origin.
9. Conclusion
Cross-border mergers and acquisition constitute the primary mode of foreign direct invest-
ment. Understanding the motives to acquire affiliates in foreign countries, and understanding the
effects of this substantial global economic activity, requires knowing what types of domestic tar-
gets multinationals seek to acquire. Here we have argued for two seemingly opposing incentives
simultaneously motivate global M&A activity.
In a multi-country world with differences in trade costs across locations, the formation of ex-
port networks endogenously creates (trade) cost synergies between firms from different locations.
Firms with high initial levels of productivity are better able to establish costly export networks,
generating larger surpluses from acquiring a target that was initially more productive. In other
words, there are strong incentives for multinational firms to seek out targets that appear to be cher-
ries in the domestic market. The incentives are even stronger for potential acquirers originating
from locations far from the domestic market.
Firm productivities are constantly changing over time. When the performance of a domestic
firm suffers, there is a greater surplus to be had by transferring control its stock of assets over
to new management. Productivity losses among target firms provide an opportunity for multina-
tional acquirers to obtain desired assets at relatively lower costs. Searching for such bargains lead
multinational firms to seek out targets that appear to be cherries on sale.
We first constructed a model with endogenous export behavior, varying productivity within
firms, and endogenous M&A activity that provided several predictions about the patterns of cross-
border acquisitions. We found strong evidence in from M&A activity in France that foreign multi-
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nationals seek firms with strong prior export behavior and recent productivity losses. We also pro-
vided further evidence on the importance of export networks by contrasting acquisition patterns
by domestic firms versus foreign multinationals, comparing foreign acquisitions across different
countries of origin.
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